This paper presents a study of the generation, manipulation and use of visual representations in different episodes of scientific discovery. The study identifies a common set of transformations of visual representations underlying the distinctive methods and imagery of different scientific fields. The existence of common features behind the diversity of visual representations suggests a common dynamical structure for visual thinking, showing how visual representations facilitate cognitive processes such as pattern-matching and visual inference through the use of tools, technologies and other cultural resources. This dynamical model suggests a way of theorizing the interaction of cognitive, socio-cultural and technological aspects of science without losing sight of the essential contribution each makes to the processes of discovery. Whereas scientific work is often construed epistemically, as having the aim of improving the fit between theories and phenomena or culturally given notions of what counts as reality, this study shows that scientists use transformations to modify visual representations in ways that achieve other kinds of match: between a representation and the cognitive demands of a task (such as pattern matching or mental rotation) or between an emerging representation and the social need to communicate and negotiate new meanings in a context of culturally embedded conventions. By showing how images connect each of the overlapping contexts of scientific work the proposed model negotiates the sometimes contested boundary between cognitive and social aspects of science.
Introduction
Science is a prolific source of new ways of describing and understanding the world and ourselves. Throughout its history scientific experience of nat-ural phenomena has been increasingly mediated by perception-extending machines and associated representational techniques. Sociologists and historians argue that the characteristic features of scientific representations are shaped by local communities of practitioners (Pickering 1992; Galison and Stump 1996) . The methods, images and beliefs of these communities define the distinctive culture of a scientific discipline (Knorr Cetina 1996) and of sub-cultures within disciplines (Galison 1997) . Psychologists have also argued that knowledge is basically shared (Freyd 1983; Resnick 1991) . Science studies and cognitive studies are converging on the view that scientific knowledge is a distributed property of organised hybrid systems of humans and machines (Clark 2003; Giere and Moffat 2003; Gorman 1997; Goodwin 1995; Hutchins 1995; Latour 1987) . These systems emerged in the industrial scale research projects of world war II (Pickering 1995) . Collaborative networks of people and machines organised on an industrial-scale require different cognitive mechanisms from those needed for processing the perceptions of an individual or small groups of researchers. Similarly the set of cognitive processes needed, say, for mathematical analysis of numerical data in one area of high energy physics may show little overlap with the set needed to interpret the graphical output of particle detection devices in another area of the same discipline (Galison 1997) . Science is not the product of individual cognitive agents yet the changing social and technological culture of science does not make the cognitive processing of individual experience irrelevant (Bogen 2002) . Some of the capacities involved, such as pattern-recognition, are biologically endowed (Clark 1997; Giere 2003; McLelland and Rumelhart 1986) . Evolutionary psychologists argue that the cognitive capacities needed to do science remain pretty much the same as they've been since the emergence of modern humans (Dunbar 1999; Gopnik 1996; Mithen 2002) . If they are correct, the changing style and appearance of the public representations produced by science is misleading: continual change hides an underlying cognitive continuity. We need ways of integrating the existence and functions of biological, mind-dependent cognitive processes into the new view of techno-science as networks of culturally situated practices that has emerged from social and historical studies of science.
The sciences repeatedly encounter novelty and transform it, integrating it into existing discourse by altering the conventions underlying exist-ing communicative practices. Case studies are a rich source of information about this dynamic. Ethnographic studies show that some cognitive processes are essentially collaborative and are socially organised so as to optimise opportunities for the application of basic cognitive functions, such as extracting particle trajectories as patterns from complex bubble-chamber images (Galison 1997, pp. 370-384 and Figure 5.29) . This organisation may be institutionalised as an authority structure (Giere and Moffatt 2003, pp. 303-304) designed to ensure that descriptions communicate information 'upwards' to those who can interpret it and construct an overview, e.g. of the collision and decay of subatomic particles (Galison 1997) or the continuously changing position of a ship on a chart (Hutchins 1995) . Whereas historical and biographical studies of image-making focus on local, culturespecific aspects of image-making (for example, Galison and Stump 1996; Jones and Galison 1998) , sociological studies focus on images in order to show how they exploit conventions to construct a consensual basis for the acceptance of scientific findings (Lynch and Woolgar, Eds. 1990; Henderson 1999; Beaulieu 2001) . Latour argued that the cognitive qua mental aspect of this process is superfluous (1990, 1987, pp. 241-244, 258) . Cognitive processes -as effected and affected by the mental capabilities of individuals -are sidelined in favour of observable aspects of the culture of science. Intellectual, theoretical and cognitive processes remain largely the domain of studies of individual historical subjects (Gruber 1974; Palmieri 2003; Tweney 1992) or of experimental subjects (Klahr 2000) .
A theory of science should show how science extends knowledge by playing to human cognitive strengths as well as to cultural resources and social conventions and systems. We focus on a matrix of images, technologies and practices to highlight less visible cognitive functions that use and modify more visible cultural resources and conventions (cp. Hutchins (1995) and Merz and Knorr-Cetina (1997) ). This work therefore identifies, behind the visible diversity of culturally specific practices, evidence for cognitive capacities common to different areas (and eras) of science (Beaulieu 2003; Feist and Gorman 1998; Carruthers, Stich and Siegal, Eds. 2002) .
An empirical focus on how diverse representations are used in different scientific fields has identified some common transformations of visual representations. These transformations display characteristics that suggest a way of identifying cognitive, social and technological aspects of science without losing sight of the essential contribution each makes to the processes of discovery. Transformations change the complexity of a visual representation, increasing or reducing its information content. Such changes are a response to the difficulty of the immediate problem that the representation is needed to solve. Thus they achieve a better match between a cognitive capacity (such as pattern matching, mental rotation or generating sections from a structural model) and the cognitive demands of reaching an immediate goal (Larkin and Simon 1987) . These transformations can therefore tell us something about the cognitive mechanisms that generate visualizing behaviour and the representations it produces, both of which can be observed. Further, transformations often function as informal inferences.
In the examples considered here, the rules are implicit but are usually externalised as procedures. Technologies are then invented to communicate, standardize and objectify these procedures. These technologies guarantee the uniformity of transformations and ensure consistency of practice and interpretation in communicating new ideas beyond the contexts of personal experience, visual imagination and the expertise of a small group of innovators.
The cases examined so far display both the same types of transformation and similar patterns of transformation. These two similarities indicate the existence of a basic approach to the use of images. We express these common features in terms of a model of visual inference. The model shows how image-based thinking does two things. First, it stimulates a demand for representations that can support communication beyond the immediate personal or local context. This shows why scientists use or invent the visualization technologies they do, at particular points in their investigations. Image-based thinking also enables scientists to interpret and validate images and data produced by new visualization techniques. Having identified a dynamical structure for visual thinking, discourse and argumentation, we can show how visual representations facilitate processes as cognitively diverse as pattern-matching, deduction, the negotiation of meanings and tool-use. The notion of distributed cognition implies that technologies for making and transforming visual representations are adapted to biologically endowed cognitive capacities. Visualization is an integral part of a collective process of theorising and engineering the world. It is no less cognitive for being cultural. After all, learning new concepts and techniques produced by others requires the ability to form personal versions of public constructs. Scientific discovery therefore requires the construction of personal representations that can be made accessible to others. It follows that visual cognition and visual imagination are not reducible to social processes (Latour 1990; Latour and Woolgar 1986, p. 280) . Thus, the scheme proposed here challenges a contested boundary between cognitive and social (Giere and Moffat 2003; Nersessian 1995 Nersessian , 2002 . It also suggests that pattern-recognition is not the only or even the most important cognitive ability enabled by distributed socio-technological systems (Clark 2003; Giere 2003) . Finally, it raises a challenge for cognitive science, which has yet to investigate image-based reasoning and problem solving as described in ethnographic and historical case studies of science (Gooding 2004a) .
Visual Imagery and Mental Models
Reasoning with imagined and externally represented images is central to the development of the phenomenology of a new domain and to the articulation and communication of its concepts, models and arguments. When scientists use visualization, they make and manipulate images in very similar ways despite the differences that define the cultural milieu of their discipline. These common features of image-based discovery and explanation suggest a general framework for visual inference that is applicable to large areas of western science. The framework specifies how images are transformed, how these transformations relate to each other and how they relate to other modes of representation and inference.
In all cases the transformations involve first abstracting features from perceptually complex 'raw' phenomena in order to identify features and relationships between them. This pattern may be represented by a sketch or more abstract image such as a diagram. This proto-type representation is transformed into a three dimensional structure of which it is taken to be a spatial or temporal section. The originating pattern may then be explicitly derived from the structure, as a spatial or temporal section. In most cases this provides an initial, provisional test of the representational adequacy of the structural model. The method also has a temporal aspect which combines visualization with the manipulation of time when 3-D models are envisaged as static 'snapshots' of a temporal process. Again, showing that either the 3-D (static) model or the originating 2-D pattern can be generated by the process, validates the 4-D (process) representation as a potentially general model. This latter step usually involves special types of external representation such as instruments that freeze or slow a process or simulations (a physical device or computer program) that reproduce the observed patterns or structures directly. In this way the ephemeral, particular, personal content of mental images is transformed into durable, general and communicable public representations such as sketches, diagrams, mental models or physical artefacts.
Internal and external representations
This interplay of internal (mental) and external (public) representations is typical of situated cognition. It calls into question the way the distinction between 'internal' (personal or mental) and external (social or cultural) representations is understood in traditional cognitive science. For example, in his early studies of externalised representations of mental images Shepard argued for an empirical investigation of the "sorts of thought processes [that] underlie human creative acts" based on study of external or "tangible products of human invention" (Shepard 1978, p. 135; Shepard 1984) . He also claimed that the creative potential of a mental image is due to its privacy and may be lost when it enters the more constrained arena of public discourse. He discussed over a dozen scientists and inventors including Einstein, Faraday and Tesla, for whom visualization was essential to the creation of novel concepts and artefacts. He assumed that the "tangible products" simply are "external embodiments of what originally were purely internal images" (ibid.). Whereas Shepard was unable to show how the two kinds of representation are related we show how visible and tangible objects and products form a material, cultural context for cognition that generates new possibilities and meanings. Shepard also argued that the personal domain enables creativity because, being private, it cannot be constrained by the conventions needed for communication and argumentation in the public domain. Therefore it cannot be institutionally controlled (Shepard 1978, p. 156) . On the contrary, while personal factors such as a measure of independence of convention and tradition are importantJames Watson's uninhibited approach to modelling the structure of DNA is a case in point -inter-personal exchanges enable creativity through a dialectical play of personal and public representations. The important feature of any representation is not whether it is a 'private' mental image or a 'public' expression, rather, it is plasticity -how readily it can be adapted to the changing demands of a creative process. Plasticity is needed to explore possibilities and negotiate meanings. Its importance has been shown independently by laboratory-based cognitive studies (Cheng 2002) , by ethnographic methods (Henderson 1991 (Henderson , 1999 Trumpler 1997) and by historical methods (Carlson and Gorman 1989; Gooding 1990; Hoddeston and Daitch 2002) .
Seeing biologically; seeing culturally; seeing naturally
The model proposed here describes one widely used method of exploiting and managing this adaptability in the context of social constraints (imaging conventions) and material resources (imaging technologies). Representations that convey aspects of nature successfully must achieve what Tversky calls a 'natural congruence' of representation to aspects of experience. This underlies the maxim suggested by her extensive review of graphical conventions:
Use spatial elements and relations naturally. Naturalness is found in natural correspondences, "figures of depiction," physical analogs, and spatial metaphors, derived from extensive human experience with the concrete world. It is revealed in language and in gesture as well as in a long history of graphic inventions. (Tversky 2002, p. 111) This type of naturalness emerges from the interaction of culture and biology in shaping perception. There is an important difference between what appears to us naturally on the basis of innate perceptual and cognitive functions (what humans can see naturally) and what is made to appear natural on the basis of conventions that engage our innate capacities and learned cultural preferences (what there is to see, according to science). Examples of perception that is innate and of biological origin include the tendency to prioritize vertical and horizontal alignments over oblique ones (Latto 2004) and the tendency to see a human face (such as the socalled face of Cydonia), in certain surface features on Mars, or a wormlike fossil structure in the Martian meteorite ALH80001 (Ball 1999, p. 2) . Other perceptions depend on a repertoire of learned responses to stimuli.
Here naturalness arises mainly from people's attempts to devise ways of communicating experience of phenomena that they take to be natural. We say that an image depicts something when it has some direct resemblance to what it is an image of or when there is an isomorphism between features of a representation and those of its object. Thus Shepard argues that the isomorphism of a visual image and an external representation of it consists in the external object producing "a perceptual experience that recreates to a high degree of approximation the subjective visual-spatial qualities of the original mental image" (1978, p. 164) . The art historian Martin Kemp argues that "beneath the varied surface run some constant currents in our human quest for visual understanding." The most enduring of these currents is our propensity to articulate acts of seeing through "structural intuitions" and that the structures of "inner intuitive" processes somehow match those of "external features whose structures are being intuited" (Kemp 2000, p. 1) . However notions such as approximation, matching and isomorphism beg the question if they are defined in terms of a subjective assessment of similarity. Such notions invoke an objective relationship between a representation and its object. Sociologists and historians argue that this epistemological problem identifies a regress that is terminated in practice by social means, that is, by the emergence of a consensus about the adequacy of a representation (Jones and Galison 1998; Latour 1990) and about the competence of practitioners. Objectivity depends entirely on social conventions of representation. On this view, mental processes have no place in explaining the emergence or stability of external representations. Socio-cultural approaches also emphasise the incommensurability of local, cultural practices in science. This leaves no way of explaining those features of representation that different contexts and cultures have in common.
The examples in this paper suggest that, on the contrary, where a novel representation is accepted as a depiction of something, this depends on common cognitive capacities as well as cultural conventions. For example, regularities are clearly perceivable by most humans as patterns (which may be visible or audible) even where the pattern cannot be defined (Ball 1999, pp. 9-14) . In the context of an innovation -where depictions of new perceptual possibilities are still being defined -the semantic and syntactic properties of images co-emerge with the appearance of objective depiction. The objectivity of the relationship between an image and what it depicts cannot be defined independently of the context in which that relationship is constructed and used. Making an innovation involves transferring informal, pliable mental images into a system of stable, conventional descriptors. It is plausible to suppose that the effectiveness of a graphical convention depends on how well it promotes the engagement of cognitive capacities that are not culture-specific by cognitive skills that reflect local cultural conventions and preferences. This engagement is a cognitive process mediated by cultural resources and social conventions and expectations. The widespread use of a method of representation highlights the particular human cognitive capacities that cultural conventions make use of. This approach allows us to investigate how a 'natural congruence', 'isomorphism' or 'structural intuition' is constructed.
Two Methods of Visualization: Analogy and Projection
Tversky's maxim applies to depictions intended to represent stable objects in the world. But does it apply when practitioners are dealing with objects and processes that are novel, invisible or ephemeral? In science images typically represent actual or possible states of affairs, entities or processes. In order to establish that a verbal token, object or image denotes some objective state of the natural world, innovators must persuade others that it does. This often involves making an analogy between the novel and something known. This is one point at which common cognitive capacities are called into play. Analogical inference is a widely discussed constituent of scientific method (Gentner, Holyoak and Kokinov 2001) . Visualization is the basis for many analogies, including inter-modal analogies. For example, when the existence of viral particles was theorised in the 1960s the 2-D pattern made by the scattering of X-rays by a viral particle was interpreted by analogy to the patterns of light and shade made by a 3-D wooden model (Kemp 2000, pp. 122-123) . In the absence of theoretical constraints on possible structures, theorists used the optical image of the macroscopic object to validate their interpretation of an X-ray diffraction pattern caused by the sub-microscopic object. New imaging techniques are also validated by inter-modal analogies, e.g., where sight is correlated to another sense such as hearing. The acceptance of early X-Ray images as veridical representations of diseased lung tissue is a typical case of perceptual analogy. The technique of osculation validates a visual (X-ray) as an image of the lung by appealing to an established acoustical method of creating a mental image of a lung. Practitioners create "likenesses" between audible changes in pitch of percussion on the patients back and visible shadows in the X-ray images. Shadows are translated into sounds (Halls Dally 1903), achieving a 'natural congruence' between how things look and how they sound. More precisely, the congruence consists of a close correlation between variations in visual appearance of lung tissue and changes in pitch as the hand is moved over the upper part of the patient's back. Once established, this correlation of sight and sound is a convention. Its naturalness depends on invoking the right cognitive capacities -here, our innate ability to correlate changes in what is heard with changes in what is seen or felt.
Visual analogy is one of a number of strategies for constructing a correspondence (or isomorphism) between shareable experiences and representations. The method shows how to see something novel in terms of something familiar by selecting from a cultural repertoire of established techniques and a biological repertoire of cognitive capacities. In these two examples an unproven method of imaging is shown to display the same patterns, structural features or regularities as those obtained either via unmediated visual perception or via established non-visual methods such as osculation. Such techniques owe their efficacy to innate, general capacities for spatial cognition which interpret visual information, often integrating visual and non-visual stimuli in order to do so (Tversky 1998) .
The sciences are constantly adding to this cultural repertoire of cognitive strategies. These include new imaging technologies which enhance the representational capabilities of science. As Dennett (following Richard Gregory) puts it, new tools require intelligence in use but also confer new kinds of intelligence (Dennett 1996, pp. 98-101) . The remainder of this paper investigates a second cognitive strategy based on construction by projection rather than analogy. This involves transforming images such as patterns and maps into models. This method confers cognitive benefits by enabling scientists to vary the information content of an image while preserving its conceptual links to other representations in the same field and its links to other culturally embedded knowledge that can be used to extend, refine and validate the emerging model.
Constructing Extinct Organisms
Flattened organisms preserved as fossils in sedimentary rock provide glimpses into the history of the evolution of life. But in order to contribute to the story, each fossil must be reconstructed as plausible model of a once living organism. In other words, it must be identified as an instance of a known -or possibly a new -species. How do paleontologists get from a mass of rock to a plausible model of an organism? By reasoning with sketches, diagrams, drawings and several kinds of model. The model that practitioners eventually accept must be compatible with many bodies of knowledge, including mineralogy, geology, ecology, morphology, physiology, evolutionary biology and taxonomy. The fossils of the Burgess shales have been difficult to interpret, notwithstanding the facts that many are complete and even traces of soft parts and internal organs are preserved (Briggs and Conway Morris 1983; Conway Morris 1979; Whittington 1985) . When shales split along cleavage planes to reveal a fossil imprint, 'part' and 'counterpart' denote the matching positive and its negative imprint. The matching parts are usually dispersed by geological process and human disturbance, often into different geological collections by paleontologists who have found only one member of a pair. Moreover the cleavage planes in the shale cut the flattened organisms at different angles. This complicates the problem of determining the identity of each impression, which must be interpreted and re-interpreted in the context of many others (Hughes 1975) . Fossils are interpreted by analogy to the morphology of modern analogues. This was at first the approach taken with many Burgess shale organisms. However, revisionist interpretations have shown that most Burgess organisms became extinct and therefore have no modern analogues. The extra difficulty with Burgess organisms arises because so many of the fossils 'image' organisms that turned out to be wholly new to science (Gould 1989) .
Reconstructing fossils involves creating images of the traces of an organism from the rock, then interpreting these in terms of structures that could represent a plausible functional morphology (Briggs and Williams 1981; Briggs and Collins 1988; Whittington 1985) . A reconstruction is considered valid only if it produces a representation of an organism that could have lived. The process involves making camera lucida drawings from photographs of positive and negative impressions of the flattened animals. Several photographs (made by varying conditions such as angles of illumination, immersion in oil or alcohol, etc.) are used. In schematic terms we have the following sequence:
(1) 'raw' data (fossil imprint) → prepared fossil imprint → unretouched photographic image(s) → camera lucida image → diagrammatic representation of photographed fossil (labelled drawing). . . They are interpreted by considering what their features could plausibly show about the anatomy of living organisms. Expert knowledge about possibilities influences the selection of features from the optical image for inclusion in the diagram, but at this stage these are still provisional interpretations of the more complex phenomenology of the 'raw' fossil imprints. A morphological interpretation of the flat (2D) photograph of a fossil is guided by the camera lucida diagram generated from the photograph but, as we shall see, the diagram also mediates between flattened features extracted from the photographic image and an emerging, 3-D model of a possible organism.
The image can be clearly seen, but what it depicts is to be worked out. The problem is to identify each fossil impression as a 2-D section of an individual belonging to a particular species. So each impression must be associated -via its camera lucida generated diagram -with other impressions which preserve 'images' of what may be the same type of animal but in different orientations, or different animals. Every fossil impression is re-imaged mentally as if from several points of view since "failure to recognize the effects of variable orientation may lead to mis-identification" (Briggs and Williams 1981, p. 157) . Each of the resulting mental images is evaluated as a possible match for other known impressions. These mental images are sketched or modelled as sections, usually of a dorsal and a lateral view (i.e. as viewed from above and from the side) but also from other viewpoints -as in Figure 1b . The image-based search for visual matches is a painstaking process, but it is essential in order to reduce the number of possible matches. One investigator reports having drawn specimens found in various orientations, then passing countless hours "rotating the damned thing in my mind" from the position of one drawing to the different angle of another, until every specimen could be moved without contradiction from one stance to the next (Gould 1989, p. 92) .
The following sequence may be iterated many times for each diagram: (2) diagrammatic representation construed as section → mental rotation → mental image of rotated section → mental comparisons made → attempted matches between drawing(s) and photographs. . . Once an organism has been identified, each image (as in Figure 1a ) can be treated as a section of a 3-D structure representing the morphology of that organism (see, e.g., Hughes 1975, Figs 8 and 10) and Figure 1b . However, where the organism is unknown, a new 3-D structure must be created. Sometimes, if the properties of the sediment permit, sectional models can be constructed by a technique of paring away layers of surrounding sediment from the specimen using an airbrush or drill (Briggs and Collins 1988, p. 780 formation: visual clues about shapes and structures, anatomical knowledge applied to the interpretation of possible structures, inferences about the function of such structures, and so on. Here, two kinds of constraint are at work: an emerging model must be consistent in a cognitive sense with the set of mental images produced by iterations of schema 2 and it must be consistent in a conceptual sense with expert knowledge about the morphology, physiology and behaviour of similar organisms. This working knowledge must in turn be compatible with other kinds of knowledge (e.g., about the animal's ecology -food sources, predators and so on). During this process the 3-D visual model is tested counterfactually in two ways. First, by showing that its sections display the same features as those shown in extant fossil diagrams, and second, by showing that an organism having such a structure would, when subjected to known geological and mineralization processes, produce the source impression(s) from which the diagrams were derived (Briggs and Williams 1981, pp. 159-160) . We now have: (4) 3-D mental model, drawn or constructed as material model → functional morphology of life-process model → derived 2-D sectional views → camera lucida diagram → reconstruction drawing → comparisons to 'raw' data (fossil imprint) → explanation of differences, where the last step invokes knowledge of biological and geological processes that could deform (or alter the topology of) the embedded specimen through decay or differential compression (Briggs and Williams 1981, p. 160) .
Taking sequences 1-4 as one complete iteration we note that the twodimensional camera lucida diagram is used twice in each iteration. It is interpreted first by constructing a three-dimensional structure and is later re-construed as evidence for the 3-D structure of which it is shown to be a geometric section or imprint. Here again -as with the mental rotation of specimens through different stances "without contradiction" -informal rules of visual inference are invoked to ensure consistency in deriving a 2-D sectional image from a 3-D construct.
For publication the source photographs may be retouched to highlight features selected as significant by the agreed, final identification. The diagrams are also redrawn as 'reconstructions' that include inferred features missing from the original images. The full reconstruction involves making detailed drawings of the organism from various views and usually also a detailed physical model (see, e.g., Whittington 1985, figs. 4.40, 4.50) . In research papers a photographic image is paired with a labelled camera lucida diagram and text (e.g., Briggs and Collins 1988, text-figure 1-3 and plate 71, pp. 782-783) . This pairing shows the reader how to interpret the photographic image in terms of 2-D images of sections of a 3-D reconstruction. Thus, readers must engage in a dialectical movement between images of the flattened layers and 3-D objects (which may be reconstruction images or images of physical models). Here we move into the social domain of negotiation and argumentation as interpretations proposed by one or a few scientists (sequences 1-2-3) are evaluated amongst a wider group of experts re-enacting sequence 4. External representations of 2-D sections and 3-D models are produced as shared objects of discussion. In practice, of course, researchers working in groups will exchange sketches and verbal descriptions throughout the process in the sort of dynamic identified in many ethnographic studies (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Knorr-Cetina 1996; Klahr 2000) . Rules governing such transformations become explicit when a reconstruction and its associated transformations are rejected by colleagues and peers. Controversies about conjectured new life-forms or the existence of an established form invokes explicit criteria for evaluating, e.g., the transformations of 2-D abstractions from camera obscura drawings of fossil imprints (Hughes 1975) .
Constructing New Cultural Objects Visually
This example illustrates several important features of spatial cognition in constructing new cultural objects. First, there is a dialectical play of mental (personal) and material (public) representations. Goldschmidt (1991) describes a similar interplay of internal and external representations in sketching (see also van Leeuwen et al. 1999; Verstijnen et al. 1998) . Second, Whittington, Briggs and others developed considerable skill in manipulating images and models that represent features discerned in inert pieces of stone. These skills are often transferred or 'delegated' to techniques which are, in turn, delegated partly or wholly to technologies. For example, a technology (the camera lucida) is used to produce the diagrams with which scientists then work. Another technique that reduces the difficulty of moving between two-and three-dimensions involves making shadow projections of 3-D models in various orientations or photographing profiles of solid 3-D models. This produces 2-D images that can be compared with the diagrams of the fossil imprint. Making a mental transformation "from two to three dimensions and back again" is an informal inference, but here it is externalised as the physical procedure of projecting the shadow of a 3-D model onto a 2-D surface. Analogous computational and mathematical methods are also used to bypass the problems of imagining a 3-D model (Doveton 1979) . Third, the fossil diagrams are abstractions which select and highlight certain features of the 'raw' imprint. Fourth: the selected features are used to construct a 3-D representation capable of integrating other kinds of information (e.g., from several theoretical sources) than the 2-D image can. In some cases the 3-D model is drawn in a wire-frame style that enables depiction of internal, structural features of the organism (see Bruton 1981 and Figure 1b) ; otherwise an external view is given (as in Figure 2 ). This 'convergent' or integrating function of such images has been noted by historians (Gooding 1992; Tweney 1992; Trumpler 1997) as well as by psychologists (Tversky 1998) . The construction and use of these 'abstractions' is readily situated with regard to discourse, argumentation, techniques and artefacts.
By studying the manipulation and use of representations such as these we can show how they work together and identify features of the larger process that produces them and through which they are accepted and used (as Hughes reinterpretation of Burgess Bella) or rejected and abandoned (as Walcott's original interpretation of the same organism). This shows that contrary to Latour's seventh rule of method (Latour 1987, p. 258 ) the cognitive role of mental representations is well within the scope of empirical investigation.
Other cases show that the same types of images and the same set of transformations as found here are widely used in the sciences. Of course there are other methods of visualization (such as analogy, illustrated above). We should note, too, that there are different ways of manipulating images. In particular, the relations between 2-D, 3-D and 4-D are more complex than changing the number of dimension. However the aim here is to explore some implications of the fact that this particular stratagem is widely used. Making transformations between 2-D and 3-D representations, matching patterns in diagrams via the features generated and integrating the results into a 4-D (living process) model -all these require particular cognitive processes. This indicates that the same set of cognitive processes is at work in many areas of science. The strategy highlighted here involves "a knack for making three-dimensional structures from two-dimensional components and inversely, for depicting solid objects in plane view" (Gould 1989, p. 101 ). This strategy is motivated by a goal common to most scientific disciplines -to explain experience visualized in terms of patterns and structures by positing physical, biological, geological and other processes.
Another feature of this method found in other domains is that 'knacks' or know-how are translated into techniques based on the skilled use of artefacts. Thus, while the rules of inferring structure from pattern, or pattern from structure, are rarely articulated, they are accessible to observation as the principles embodied in techniques such as projecting the shadow of a 3-D model onto a 2-D surface. When these techniques are recognised as embodying intelligent solutions, they can be used by cognitive psychologists to understand visual cognition. Thus, historical and ethnographic studies of imaging technologies complement both the sociology of consensus-formation and the psychology of visual cognition. Moreover, once the cognitive function of the image-transformation technologies is identified, contemporary controversies can also be investigated using in vivo methods (Klahr 2000) .
How Images Mediate Between Thought and Culture: a Model
The structure of visual inference Figure 3 diagrams the structure of the process in which these representations are used. Arrows between nodes represent the transformation of a representation. Nodes represent the dimensionality of each kind of representation. Thus node A in Figure 3 denotes an un-interpreted source of information. This may be non-visual, such as a piece of shale, a numerical dataset (as in the next example) or unresolved behaviours of objects produced by laboratory manipulations and technologies. Node B denotes 2-dimensional abstractions such as diagrams of the raw fossil imprints and the very detailed reconstructions produced later from process models. Salient features are selected; regularities are identified as patterns. Node C represents the product of rotating one or more of the images at B to create a 3-D construct. This structure can be mentally imaged or a drawn model (as in Figure 1b ). Our next example shows that a 3-D model can have greater information-bearing capacity than the images from which it is constructed. Whereas each 2-D image is a particular instance, the 3-D model integrates information contained in the sections. It is therefore a kind of generalization.
Node D denotes a process model that integrates different kinds of information (e.g., about morphology, vital processes, habitat, etc.). In the more concrete, sensory terms of a multi-modal representation, constructing the process model invokes one or more sets of transformation rules. These can either (a) govern changes in the structure postulated at node C, due to physical, chemical or other processes, or (b) show how the structure postulated at node C supports a known process. An example of (a) would be a sequence of block diagrams showing the effects of geophysical action on rock structures through time. The evaluation and validation of 3-D models of reconstructed fossils is an example of (b). Other examples are given below. Objects at node D involve a complex combination of information in which visual representation is augmented by labelling (letters and numbers, colours, textures) or symbols (such as arrows) indicating process. Objects at nodes C and D also generalise from the particular instances represented by patterns or diagrams at node B.
The transformations are generative in that each produces a new image, mental model or physical construct. The fossil example shows that it is Moves from unresolved phenomena to a set of features or relationships (pattern or diagram), from process to structure or from structure to pattern (arrows AB, CB, DC) generate new visualizations that usually have less information content than their sources. Moves from pattern to structure (arrow BC) and from structure to process (arrow CD) generate visual models having enhanced information content.
sometimes useful to reduce the information content of a representation but at other times it is necessary to combine information from different sources. Transformations which enhance the representation, increasing its capacity to represent information, are shown by a solid arrow (BC, CD). This is achieved by adding a dimension -making a pattern into a structure or integrating a sequence of structural states as a process model. A transformation which creates a simpler or more abstracted representation by reducing its information capacity is shown in Figure 3 by a dotted arrow (AB, CB, DC, DB). Both types of transformation occur throughout a process of interpretation and theory construction. They may be informal inferences or implemented as procedures. The frequency of each kind will vary according to the immediate problem or goal. The examples considered in this paper illustrate five features of the process diagrammed in Figure 3: (1) The process begins with a 'reduction' from a source of data that is complex, wholly or partly un-interpreted and is often non-visual.
Visualization techniques and technologies are used to produce the abstractions from which interpretations and theories are developed. (2) Different kinds of cognitive process are invoked in making moves between each of the nodes. This depends on whether a representation is being enhanced or reduced. This in turn depends on whether the immediate goal is to integrate additional information or to simplify. (3) Simplification occurs in two distinct contexts: at the outset, in order to select relevant features of complex phenomena or data, and later when demonstrating a link between a complex construct and evidence for it. Thus, (4) the process is iterative, i.e. cyclical. (5) Different patterns of inference will occur in each iteration. For example, it may be necessary to make many provisional 3-D constructions (moving between nodes B and C) before attempting to integrate this construct with a wider body of morphological and taxonomic knowledge. Evaluating the capability of this structure to support life processes may involve many more moves between nodes C and D than between C and B.
The PSP model. This model captures some general features of the use of visualizations in a range of scientific fields. As such, it allows us to show that the public representations produced and used in scientific discovery, such as sketches, diagrams, and maps, bear a distinct, inferential relationship to each other. Of course the actual pattern of inference varies from case to case -depending, for example, on contingent factors which also influence stylistic and other features of the representations. In the fossil case contingent factors are the availability of matched part-counterpart pairs, whether the surrounding sedimentation permits micro-dissection, whether other animals from the same sediment are considered to be extant or extinct, and so on. Nevertheless all cases display the set of transformations shown in Figure 3 . We can summarise this process as the iterative scheme: (5) source → pattern → structure → process → pattern → . . . where each arrow indicates some transformation of a representation.
In what follows this generalized structure will be abbreviated as the PSP scheme. It provides a way of comparing the functions of images, sketches, and diagrams across different cases of scientific discovery. It also enables us to discriminate those inferences based on transformations that are projective (enhancing or reducing the dimensionality of images) from those transformations that involve other, non-visual kinds of cognitive process. For example, pattern matching can take place between representations having the same dimensionality while informal inference takes place between representations having different dimensionality; formal, rulebased inference involves symbolic representations manipulated according to conventions governing attributes other than empirical content. The PSP model is not an exhaustive theory of all kinds of visualization. Nevertheless it shows how each use of an image can be related to the cultural context of scientific observation, experimentation, modelling, dissemination and argument.
Dimensions, complexity and process
Scientific work must address the problem of representing process by drawn or printed images which cannot represent process experientially as, say, an animation or simulation model can. Signs such as arrows are used to indicate the need to iterate versions of the image through a series of transformations. Time is a non-spatial dimension which must be represented spatially in visual images such as plots and diagrams. We refer to images that include non-visual information indicating process as fourdimensional. The number of dimensions indicates the information capacity of representations: generally (although not necessarily) more dimensions imply greater capacity to convey information (Tufte 1983 (Tufte , 1990 . This is not a fixed or formal relationship because the information density of a visual representation depends on the conventions which an audience applies to interpret the image. Thus we may select just a few features from a complex image; conversely the few features of a simple, abstract image (or the combination of features) may convey a great deal of information.
The ability to move between simple (abstract) and complex descriptions is a key to interpretation and explanation of phenomena in many scientific domains. This often involves moving between two, three and four dimensions. Why should this be? A possible answer is suggested by the fact noted earlier, that each transformation in the PSP process has a specific effect -of increasing or decreasing the complexity of the representation it produces. Both types of transformation have clear cognitive benefits for the stages of discovery and communication at which they are invoked. When source phenomena are too complex to interpret directly or when a complex representation proves difficult to think with or about, then it is necessary to abstract and simplify. At other times it is necessary to accumulate and integrate more -or different types of information. Manipulation produces the 3-D and 4-D representations whose greater complexity supports the integration of information in models that can explain source phenomena and predict new ones. Complex representations are difficult to describe verbally, or to reason with. They are often expressed in specially devised propositional or mathematical forms. However their implications can sometimes be generated as simple representations that contain only the information relevant to the task at hand. For example, a 3-D structural model of an extinct organism is 'tested' empirically by showing that it can generate each of the patterns it had been constructed to explain. In this way simplification and elaboration of visual images enables different kinds of reasoning and argumentation.
The second example illustrates two features of visual methods. The first is the cognitive advantage of reducing data-sets to simple visual images. This makes it possible to interpret the data by constructing 3-D models from 2-D arrays. The second is that visual methods first developed to construct a new theory can be re-presented as rhetorical support for its credibility. Here, the imaging method is re-constituted as a way of explaining known biochemical functions in terms of previously unknown, non-observable physiological structures.
Constructing the Invisible: Vascular Structures from Modular Sections
One function of the liver is to regulate the supply of glucose to the blood, given fluctuations in the nutritional supply of sugars. Regulation is achieved by opposing systems of enzymes that act to release glucose or to reduce the uptake of glucose into the blood. The enzyme chemistry is understood but in some mammalian livers there is a long-standing puzzle as to the physiology that supports the two opposed enzyme actions. Structures must exist but cannot be observed by the usual methods of observation based on close visual inspection of sections such as those imaged in Figure 4a ( Teutsch 2002) . Moreover in some mammals dissection does not support the structure hypothesis directly. The problem is therefore to construct a physiologically plausible structure using clues provided by non-visual data.
In order to achieve a spatial separation of the opposing catalytic actions of the enzymes, investigators made a close study of rates of glucose uptake and release in cryosections of many rat livers, so as to envision -from a spatially distributed set of discrete measurements -a possible structure supporting the known process. Work by Harald Teutsch and his collaborators produced a fully functional model of structures that cannot be observed directly. To develop an empirical method for deciding between different models of the relationship between liver function and its structure, a large numerical data set about biochemical process in the liver is organised first into two-dimensional and then three-dimensional arrays. Further visualizations plot gradients of activity rather than discrete values (see Figure 5a) . Increasing the quantity of data improved the 'resolution' of the plots, making it possible to infer sub-modular structures consisting of populations of cells. These become the framework for theorizing the invisible physiological structures. The final result of the reconstructive method is a 4-D or process model that provides a physiological explanation of the source images (visualized data). The method of reconstructive visualization is presented as demonstrating the superiority of one structural theory over others.
Over a period of ten years Teutsch was able to demonstrate this modularity and the vascular structures that support it by constructing 3-D images from virtual 'stacks' of images of very thin cryosections (Teutsch et al. 1988 (Teutsch et al. , 1992 (Teutsch et al. , 1999 . A few images from a larger set of drawings of these is shown in Figure 5b . A structure for the modules and of the ducts that supply and drain them was visualized in a set of 3-D drawings (Figure 5c ). This was validated using 3-D image printing technology. The 3-D images guided further construction of models in paste and plastic. Actual construction is needed to work out how the modular structure incorporates portal and venal ducts (not shown, see Teutsch 1992, figs. 4a-4d; Teutsch 1999, p. 499, fig. 4 ). Just as drawing in two dimensions directs attention to features, physical modelling checks the efficacy of a structure with regard to function (here and in the case of the Burgess shale fauna) or phenomenology (as in the case of X-ray crystallography, see de Chadarevian and Hopwood, Eds. 2003; Gooding 2004b) . These complex vascular structures are now considered to be facts established by the method of reconstructive visualization. We noted earlier that scientists devise technologies to make transformations between two and three dimensions. Here three-dimensional printing technology automates the process of assembling a 3-D structure from a large set of data-generated 2-D section plots. This function of the 3-D printer is analogous to the methods of physical projection and mathemat- ical transformation that paleobiologists use to move consistently between two-and three-dimensional representations. These methods of reconstruction combine veridical images, schematic images, 2-D and 3-D plots, 3-D stacks of 2-D plots and physical models. These examples provide far more detail about the process of accumulating and structuring numerical and visual data than Shepard's (1978) studies do. They also show how technologies such as new imaging methods extend the domain to which cognitive processes such as visualization can be applied. Studies of visualization in other fields -including X-ray crystallography, geophysics and electromagnetism -indicate that the same interplay of material methods and inferential strategies is at work. This suggests that the method of visualization described by the PSP schema is used very widely in the sciences. Some key points from two other case studies are summarised in the next section.
Visual Theories: Process Explains Patterns
During the 1960s controversy over continental drift imaged data and visual models were crucial to the construction and acceptance of an explanatory model. This involved constructing 3-D and 4-D models from numerical magnetic intensity data displayed in the form of patterns. In the previous decade measurements of residual magnetization of the ocean floor were made by magnetometer scans along well-defined paths. Numerical datasets of these scans were accumulated into anomaly maps, so called because they display a local short-wavelength disturbance in the intensity of magnetisation measured above the seafloor (see Figure 6a ). An anomaly map displays patterns of magnetization built up by many hundreds of scans and each map represents many thousands of numerical readings (Raff and Mason 1961) . It displays, as stripes of varying intensity, the permanent magnetisation of each strip of the seafloor. Viewed magnetically, the eastern Pacific seafloor consists of alternating strips (Phinney, Ed. 1968; LeGrand 1990; Giere 2001) . Such images showed the widespread existence of polarity reversals that had been established in cores from the Pacific in 1964. The anomaly maps can be enhanced to incorporate other relevant phenomena and features, such as centres of volcanic activity or earth quakes, the chemical composition, thickness, temperature and the underlying geology of the sea-floor (Figure 6b ). Three-dimensional models were constructed from these maps. Drawn as block diagrams (see Figure 6c ) these static models integrate several different types of information. Thus, a single drawing develops as a new focus of thought and argument.
The magnetometer data was also imaged another way, as field intensity plots. These are x-y graphs which show variations in intensity and polarity along each traverse of a line perpendicular to the striping pattern. Vine (1966) used well-established lava dating techniques (Cox, Doell, and Dalrymple 1968) to correlate and date magnetization profiles from different regions of the earth in which seafloor spreading has taken place. This method superimposes patterns that record the magnetic history of different geological formations. The 'stacking' of images creates a structure of 2-D images that represents as simultaneous, events occurring in different parts of the earth. This manipulation of the information content of visualized data is a form of argumentation. Superposition of visualized data shows that the same temporal pattern of reversals occurs in different oceans, supporting the generalization that the pattern of magnetic reversals is global (see Heirtzler 1968, esp. Figs. 6-7) . Just like Teutsch's 3-D 'stacking' of 2-D visualized cryosection data, Vine's combining 2-D plots into a 3-D 'stack' of plots integrates salient features of large quantities of information into a single representation that supports inferences about structure and process. I have shown elsewhere that 'stacking' to accumulate information about a temporally extended and spatially distributed process is also an important technique in bench top experiments (Gooding 2004a) .
Images played yet a third role in this episode. Despite evidence supporting the theory of continental drift, until 1962 no mechanism had been proposed that explained the movement of continents (Hess 1962 (Hess , 1965 . In 1963 Vine and Matthews proposed a theory of ocean floor spreading to explain the striping shown in binary (black and white) versions of the anomaly maps (Vine and Matthews 1963; Vine and Wilson 1965; Vine 1968) . They surmised that molten basalt is magnetized as it cools. Its magnetization is determined by the sense of the earth's field at the time it cools. This magnetization subsequently affects the field strength in the region above it, being 'added' to or 'subtracted' from the earth's field. Where extrusion continues during periodic reversals of polarity the magnetic striping of the sea floor becomes a record of these reversals. This hypothesis postulates a process that explains the anomaly patterns and also relates them to a mechanism producing movement of continental plates. It is depicted as the block diagram in Figure 6c . At this point the 3-D diagrams in Figures 6b and 6c stand for a state (say, the current structure) of the 4-D process, so mediating between the process explanation and the patterns displayed by data (shown schematically across the top of Figure 6b ). In its simplest form the model implies the extrusion of reversely magnetised 'blocks' of basalt due to convection. The anomaly patterns now cease to be anomalous -they are re-interpreted as an historical record of the effects of the process of extrusion, cooling and magnetisation. The visual model also offered new visual evidence for continental drift. In 1965 Vine and Wilson inferred that the extrusion process should produce striping that is symmetrical. If molten basalt is extruded along a fissure identified as a ridge, the patterns (shown on the top surface of Figure 6b ) and field intensity plots should show mirror symmetry either side of this ridge. Vine and his colleagues then found scans that displayed this property. One of these -Eltanin-19 -displayed it particularly well (Pitman and Heirtzler 1966, p. 1166; Vine 1968, p. 75) . This visual demonstration of symmetry was crucial to the acceptance of the reality of seafloor spreading. It is significant that Vine presented anomaly maps, intensity plots and block diagrams together in a single composite Figure ( see Vine 1968, p. 75) . This juxtaposition increases the persuasive force of each plot or diagram. The 19th experimentalist Michael Faraday used similar techniques of visual juxtaposition (Gooding 1989; Wise 1979) . In cognitive terms this episode displays the same three kinds of transformation of images and visual models that we saw with fossil morphology and liver structure: 3-D and 4-D representations accumulate and integrate large quantities of data about different features as a single composite image. Each transformation alters a representation to achieve certain cognitive benefits: a reduction simplifies a complex representation (e.g., to display the 2-D symmetry predicted by the 4-D process model) while an enhancement increases representational content by integrating information from different sources. Simple superposition of plots (stacking) enables patternmatching comparisons to be made. The images also support generalisation and argumentation.
Visual Inference and Mental Process
These three examples identify two kinds of transformations as visual inferences -enhancement and reduction -that generate representations of greater or lesser complexity and information content. The PSP diagram in Figure 3 indicates how scientists use these transformations in the course of interpreting data, constructing a theory, and finally validating that theory, both as an explanation of the source-data and for testing purposes, as a source of new features. The examples considered show how images are used in the inter-personal or social domain. All point to socially situated cognitive processes. Advocates of a cognitive-historical approach in science studies argue that detailed records of problem-solving behaviour found in diaries and laboratory notebooks allow us to carry the analysis further. Sometimes records of laboratory work are sufficiently detailed (as with Edison, Faraday and Darwin, to name but a few) as to allow us to investigate some of the mental processes at work, from transformations on images in the public domain to mental processes on objects that have not yet become shared representations. Work by Tweney (1989 Tweney ( , 1992 and Gooding (1992 Gooding ( , 1990 indicates how such an analysis could be developed.
Sometimes regularities are directly apparent to the eye or ear -as with sand patterns on a beach or rhythmical sounds in speech and music. It is usual to construct 2-D images, such as the camera lucida drawing in Figure 1a or the plots in Figure 5a . Like the scientists described earlier, Davy and Faraday developed procedures to maximize both the capacity of ordinary perception and the ability to reason with its products (Faraday 1821 (Faraday : 1821 . Faraday was also concerned to establish the limitations of unassisted perception (Faraday 1831) . It is no surprise that he produces representations whose cognitive (generative) and social (communicative and critical) functions are intertwined. Moreover, Faraday used the same visual transformations indicated by our previous examples, developing them into a powerful method of investigation.
Faraday's work is recorded over thirty years and in sufficient detail to show that different elements of the visual inference scheme are used in personal as well as public contexts (Martin, Ed. 1932-36; James, Ed. 2004) . Taken in the context of his publications and public demonstrations, his personal records show that the same pattern of visual inference is at work over the long term as in short-term problem solving. In other words, the visual strategies characterised in Figure 3 are used to construct new ideas, to integrate distinct domains of phenomena, and to communicate his unfamiliar and often unconventional notions to others. Visualization works in conjunction with investigative actions to produce a phenomenology of mental images, material objects and words (Magnani 2001) . This phenomenology includes proto-representations that merge images and words in tentative interpretations of novel experience. These word-image-object hybrids have a cognitive function and a socio-cognitive one: they integrate different types of knowledge and experience gained in different sensory modalities, and they support movement between the personal domain of 'mental' representations and the social domain of public tokens of meaning and the conventions that govern them. Both functions are particularly important when communicating and theorizing new phenomena and unfamiliar concepts.
Faraday's constructive method involved moving from effects imaged as 2-D patterns to 3-D structures which could then be animated either as thought-experiments in time or as material, bench-top simulations of the invisible processes. For example, the electromagnetic 'rotation motor' he invented in 1821 produced a process (in four-dimensions) which linked the patterns discerned in his minute observation of needle-wire interaction (two-dimensions) via a number of hypotheses expressed as structural models and designs for apparatus (three-dimensions). The first sketches he drew images what he thought he could see wires and magnets doing. They were tools for thinking about phenomena, not representations of stable, replicable outcomes (Gooding 2004a) . In other words, their semantic content (what they depict) and their syntax was worked out over time. By contrast, the final images of the electromagnetic rotation phenomena drawn at the end of the 1821 experiments do depict an actual, reproducible phenomenon. This depictive function had been accomplished during several days of experimental work. These same images had been made into public representations whose meaning is operationalized and communicated through replicable experimental procedures. They could now communicate Faraday's personal experience as a basis for shared experience.
Discussion and Conclusions
Tracing the histories of sketches and the published images derived from them shows that the function and meaning of an image varies. Two of the cases described above are summarized in Table 1 . This locates each of the representations discussed in the examples according to its complexity. In the table, dimensionality increases from left to right. Dimensionality indicates complexity and is related to information-bearing capacity. Each column in Table 1 contains images and artefacts having a different order of representational capability. Each transformation alters a representation to achieve certain cognitive benefits: a reduction simplifies a complex representation while an enhancement increases representational content by integrating information from different sources. Column 5 contains a derived consequence of the process model. These derivations may be either retro-dictions or predictions. The table illustrates how visual representations are related to each other in two of the examples. The types of image used in columns 2-5 of Table 1 (compare nodes B, C and D of Figure 3 ) indicate how cognitive processes that differ in duration and representational complexity work together to enable problem-solving in the cases described.
In visual inference as set out in Figure 3 and Table 1 , recognition of patterns and of similarities between pattern-like features at node B would involve what cognitive and evolutionary psychologists label as biologicalband processes (Newell 1990; Clark 2003) . However, some of those 2-D representations are generated by simplifying representations of structures and processes. If we take 'direct' perception of similarities as biologically 2.5 imaged cytosections; Submodular structures engendered pattern matching (operating on images at node B) then the cases I have described suggest that processing in the biological, cognitive and rational bands must work together as part of the same connected process and not sequentially as Newell's decomposition thesis implies. Similarly the integrative function of structure-and process-representations (columns 3 and 4 in the table or nodes C and D in Figure 3 ) also suggests overlap and interaction of processes in Newell's cognitive, rational and social bands. The examples of paleobiology and geophysics show that pattern-recognition works in conjunction with more complex visualizations. An example is Vine's (1966 Vine's ( , 1968 derivation of the 2-D seafloor striping pattern as a consequence of the 4-D basalt extrusion process (node D), as modelled in a 3-D block diagram (Figure 6b , c at nodes C and D). These transformations are motivated and deliberative, hence they must occur in Newell's rational-band. Yet according to the PSP model they require manipulation and interpretation which are cognitive-band processes and pattern matching which is a biological band process. The ability to see the significance of similarities that are perceived 'directly' (by comparing patterns) depends on deliberative kinds of reasoning with and about visual models of hidden inferred process. Similarly, communicating the significance of these representations involves both deliberation with and negotiation about them. If Newell's cognitive reduction implies nonsimultaneity then long-duration 'social' processes are not wholly reducible to short duration cognitive or hardwired processes (Gooding 2004a ). The PSP model also suggests that while Giere rightly emphasises the socially distributed character of scientific knowledge, he is mistaken in arguing that scientific cognition can be reduced entirely to pattern matching systems (Giere 2002, pp. 306-307) . In addition to pattern matching, cognitive processes using general and simple rules of manipulation are also at work.
Other features of discovery suggests that Newell's cognitive hierarchy does not apply to socially and technologically situated processes. First, the fact that the function of an image varies implies only that additional cognitive functions are brought to bear on it, not that these do not operate simultaneously. The function implied by use of an image in one context indicates that a particular cognitive mechanism is at work. The same image used in another context may involve a different underlying cognitive process. For example, Faraday's initial sketches of magnet-needle interactions (see Gooding 1990 Gooding , 2004a represent his mental imaging of embodied, multimodal perceptual interaction with objects and forces, but later these become objects of deliberative thought about their physical meaning. Later still they function in the public domain as visual evidence for a new model of electromagnetic action. This variability of function also occurs with images entirely within the social domain of published representations. Raff and Mason's (1961) seafloor magnetization patterns ( Figure 6a ) and Teutsch's intensity plots ( Figure 5b) were first a cognitive resource (for interpretation and modelling) and later acquired an epistemic one (evidence for the visual theory constructed from them). The camera lucida diagrams of fossil imprints (Figure 2 ) also had this dual function. Second, a key feature of creative processes identified in many case studies is the ability to maintain several lines of inquiry over a long period of time and to transfer fruitful ideas and methods between them (Gruber 1974) . In many cases this involves analogical transfer. This can be achieved by visualizations at different levels of abstraction. The most concrete and intuitive would be 'direct' recognition of a similarity at the perceptual level, such as Robert Young's recognition of similarities between the behaviour of water waves and ray-diagrams of optical interference (Miller 1996) . This would also rely on fast cognitive processing that is closely coupled to evolved neural structures. Faraday's recognition of the potential significance of relationships between the behaviour of electric filaments, electrostatic lines and magnetic lines also falls into this category. At a more abstract level are similarities whose analogical significance derives from the fact that they are features generated by structural-or process models in different domains.
The cases described here show that the multiple functions of representations are essential to negotiating the appearance, meaning and acceptance of new phenomena, models and theories. I have attempted to capture both multiplicity and simultaneity in diagrammatic form, in Figure 3 . But this diagram suffers the same limitations as any other visualization of a process: printed images are static, appearing less process-like than scientists intend. In all the examples the scientific goal is to explain certain regularities in phenomena by discovering and modelling a process. We have seen that discovery goes hand-in-hand with the visualization of structures that can relate observations (reduced to patterns) to processes which are too complex to depict. This method allows scientists in diverse fields to vary the level of abstraction to suit what they perceive to be constant about relationships between the variables they are interested in. The PSP model describes a method whereby scientists move between visual representations of varying complexity and other kinds of representation. This model is an empirical generalization about how visualization works to integrate information from different sensory sources and of differing degrees of abstractness. It suggests a dynamical, non-hierarchical account of how cognitive processes relate to each other.
Scientific methods are particularly effective at combining a range of innate cognitive capacities with the socially oriented and culturally organised aspects of making new knowledge, such as technologies and symbol systems. Although many of the transformations described here were made according to informal rules, these are externally regulated by social means (evaluation and criticism by other experts) and by procedures and instruments devised to standardise transformations between two, three and four dimensions. Technologies externalise the mental skills involved. This shows how closely integrated cognitive processes are with social and technological features of culture. Of course there are other, non-visual ways of establishing the isomorphism of words, images and symbols to what they denote in a scientific domain. Yet images are clearly conducive to the dialectical movement between interpretative, creative stages in which representations are plastic and meanings are negotiable (Star and Griesemer 1989; Henderson 1999) and the deliberative, rational stages in which socially sustained conventions and evaluative criteria are invoked.
Where rules and methods are domain-specific this indicates a socially established consensus about procedures and meanings. But strategies that are used in many areas of science, such as the PSP process, identify domain-independent cognitive capacities. Thus, the scheme displays the connectedness of cognitive and social aspects of cognition by showing how images connect each of the overlapping contexts of scientific work: the personal realm of the mind's eye, external representations of embodied interaction with the world, technologies that mediate perception and visual inference, and the social domain of communication and negotiation.
